A good question to keep in mind as you read this paper: How might Campbell's view allow us to deal with the Enterprise case?
In this paper, Campbell develops a version of the view of perceptual demonstratives that was introduced by Evans in Varieties of Reference (and pressaged in "Understanding Demonstratives"). As it happens, there is much dispute about how to understand Evans's view, and so Campbell's is just one way of developing it. For another, see Michael Martin's contribution to this symposium, "The Shallows of the Mind", which is in the second half of the PDF from JSTOR linked above.
Campbell begins by sketching certain contrasts between "propositional" and "imagistic" content. What he has in mind here is really a contrast between cognitive states, such as belief and desire, and perceptual states, such as seeing and hearing. The larger issue in which he is interested is how to understand the relation between cognition and perception: How, for example, can our visual experience serve to justify our beliefs? But the more specific issue in this paper is how perceptual experience of a thing (e.g., seeing it) can make it possible to think about it (e.g., have beliefs about it) or talk about it (i.e., refer to it).
Campbell observes that simply being able to perceive a thing does not by itself make thought about that thing possible. What one needs as well, he suggests, is to attend to the thing, that is, to focus on it, to select it from the manifold of one's perception "for further processing". (This notion has been much discussed in philosophy. See the Stanford Encylopedia article for an overview. Section 3.2 discusses some of Campbell's views.) In particular, to think demonstratively about an object, one must attend to it perceptually and treat certain of the information one is receiving perceptually as specially relevant to one's demonstrative thoughts about that object.
And, Campbell claims, the "attentional link" does not just connect one's propositional (cognitive) representations of an object with one's imagistic (perceptual) representations of it. Rather, it "is part of what makes the propositions the propositions they are". Or, to put it in more Fregean language, the fact that one is perceiving and attending to the object is part of what gives fixes the sense of one's thoughts about that object, so perceived.
In section II, Campbell focuses on this sort of question: how connections with perception might help us understand the senses of demonstrative thoughts.
As Campbell sees it, the issue raised by Frege's puzzle is really one about when it is permissible to "trade on identity" in making a certain inference without thereby appealing to a suppressed identity premise. So, as he says, the inference from "The Morning Star is F" and "The Morning Star is G" to "The Morning Star is both F and G" seems fine. But the inference from "The Morning Star is F" and "The Evening Star is G" to "The Morning Star is both F and G" seems enthymematic: It relies upon an unstated premise. How is this way of thinking of Frege's puzzle related to the more usual one involving informativity and cognitive significance? (This is not at all obvious.)
How, Campbell asks, "are we to characterize in detail the senses of perceptual demonstratives" (p. 60)? He suggests we answer this question in terms of facts about perceptual attention. Roughly, the idea is that, if two perceptual demonstratives "that tree" are attentionally linked to the very same perceptual information, then the demonstratives will have the same sense. If they are linked to different information, then they will have different senses.
As I have stated it, this is too rough, since the notion of "same perceptual information" needs to be explained. In a strict sense, one might think of perceptual information as time-sensitive and fleeting, so that one could only be using the "same perceptual information" twice if one were using it twice at the same time. Campbell wants (and needs) a more flexible notion. This is why he talks in terms of a "principle of selection being used to isolate some of one's current imagistic information as all relating to one object" (p. 60). What does this 'isolating' is supposed to be attention: If so, then one can see why attention would be essential to demonstrative thought.
Campbell suggests, on the basis of empirical work on perceptual attention, that what "principle of selection" very often involves perceived location, and that this allows us to explain demonstrative Frege cases. How so? How, for example, might it enable us to handle the Enterprise case? Does it seem like the right way to handle that sort of case?
Campbell then contrasts his view with Evans's (pp. 62-3), to which it bears some close relation, and then discusses the role of the "causal significance of objects" in one's thought about them (pp. 63-5). We won't discuss either of these topics, so, as noted above, you can skim this material.
In section III, Campbell discusses similar themes, but in connection with auditory rather than visual perception. So, in this kind of case, we can think about "that man" not because we can see him, but because we can hear him. (E.g., "I sure wish that man wouldn't talk so loudly. I can hear him through the wall!") The issue is whether, in this sort of case, spatial attention—attention whose organizaing prinicple is spatial location—must play the same role that it plays in the case of vision. Campbell argues that there are no good arguments that it must.
The final section ostensibly concerns the phenomenon known as "immunity to error through misidentification". Campbell explains this notion pretty well, though exactly how to understand it is controversial. (See this paper by Jim Pryor if you are interested in this sort of question.) In fact, however, the real topic of this section is whether Campbell's view is descriptivist, and if so how it is different.
How does Campbell think his view differs from a descriptivist one? Is it importantly different?